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Ross: Atwood v. Judge

MUNICIPAL LAW
Power of Municipal Corporationsto Lay Off Employees
Atwood v. Judge, 63 Ohio App. 2d 94, 409 N.E.2d 1022 (1977)
I.

INTRODUCTION

A TIME when the future of the American economy appears bleak,
and the necessity to curtail vital urban services becomes commonplace in our cities, the significance of the decision rendered by the Ohio
Court of Appeals for Columbiana County in Atwood v. Judge' deserves to
be noted. The tension between the public interest in maintaining vital
services within the community and the state mandate' that a city operate
within its budget is not satisfactorily resolved by the court.

In late May, 1976, the Director of Public Service-Safety of East Liverpool, Ohio, Mr. Judge, informed several members of the city's police and fire
fighting departments that they were to be laid off effective June 1, due to the
lack of funds to pay their salaries. The mayor ordered the lay-offs after being
informed of the city's financial condition by the city auditor. On June 1, plaintiffs (all the personnel who were to be laid off, two citizen taxpayers and several policemen and fire fighters who were unaffected by the lay-off decision)
filed a "complaint for a temporary and permanent injunction [against the
director] and the trial court granted a temporary restraining order."3 After
the defendant's motion to dismiss was overruled, the court conducted
several hearings on plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction that
would prevent defendant from either carrying out the contemplated layoffs or failing to pay all policemen and fire fighters their wages, pursuant
to the provisions of the contract entered into by the city with the fire fighter's
and policemen's unions in April, 1976.' This injunction was granted by
the court in July, 1976.
Plaintiff's trial brief included the argument that there were, in fact,
sufficient funds with which to pay the salaries of all safety department employees.' Although it was not stated at trial, the fact that the city could enter
into a new contract with the safety department employees' unions in April
that called for more money to be paid out in salaries, and then, in May,
decide to lay off members of those unions for lack of funds to pay those
salaries, indicates a serious deficiency in municipal planning.

1

63 Ohio App. 2d 94, 409 N.E.2d 1022 (1977).

2

OHIo REV. CODE

ANN.

§ 5705.39 (Page 1980).

a 63 Ohio App. 2d at 95, 409 N.E.2d at 1025.
Id. at 97, 409 N.E.2d at 1026.
5 Id. at 106, 409 N.E.2d at 1031.
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The trial court found that the director had usurped the power of the
city council by changing the number of police and fire personnel, 6 a number
which was set by statute at the time.' The court found that the defendant's
action "constituted a gross abuse of discretion"8 which was not substantiated
by the facts of the city's financial condition in 1976. The court also noted
that the lay-offs "would have dangerously injured the health, safety and
welfare of the residents of the city of East Liverpool." 9 The defendant, the
Director of Public Service-Safety, appealed from the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas.
II.

BACKGROUND - THE METHOD BY WHICH OHIO MUNICIPALITIES
ALLOCATE AND SPEND MONEY.

The preparation of a municipal tax budget, and its relationship to
the annual appropriation ordinance of a city, is something that needs to
be appreciated before one can begin to understand the situation in Atwood.
When formulating a budget for the coming fiscal year,'" each supervisor of a municipal department is required by law1 ' to present to the
mayor, near the end of the current fiscal year, an estimate of the necessary
operating expenses of his department. Such an estimate should include a
contingency sum for all necessary improvements. Along with approximate
future costs, the estimate should include a designation of which municipal
funds (general or special) that department expects to use to pay for those
costs. In specifying which funds or accounts are to fund his department,
each municipal supervisor is required to state an approximate amount of
revenue expected to flow into those accounts. For example, in East Liverpool, there were probably certain funds designated "public safety" funds
and certain taxes earmarked for those funds.
The mayor will pass those estimates and recommendations to the taxing authority of the city (the city council). 2 After conducting hearings
on a new proposed budget, they will formalize that proposal and submit
it to the county auditor 3 who will determine the appropriate tax rates
necessary to keep the revenue coming into the city's treasury at the minimal
level necessary to meet the operational expenditure demands of the city."'

a Id.

at 96, 409 N.E.2d at 1025.

T Id. at 96, 104, 409 N.E.2d at 1025, 1030.

6 Id. at 96, 409 N.E.2d at 1025.
a Id.
10 This information was drawn -in
19.52-19.69 (2d ed. 1975).
21 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5705.28
12 OHIo MuNIciPAL LAw, supra note
is Owo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5705.30
14

part from I I.

CROWLEY, OrIo MUNIcIPAL

LAw

(Page 1980).
10, at 1 19.52.

(Page 1980).

0mo REV. CODE ANN. S 5705.34 (Page 1980).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/8
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The county budget commission will rubber-stamp the auditor's recommendations to this effect and send it back to city council."
After passing the tax rates the county auditor has recommended,
8
the city council will then return them to him for final approval.' The auditor
will use these tax rates to produce his "official certificate of estimated resources,"'" which is his official estimate of what the city's tax revenues will
be for the next year, based on the tax rates and the existing taxable assets
within the city. When the council receives the certificate from the auditor,
it will revise its first budget and pass the annual appropriation ordinance
which allows distribution of the tax revenues into the appropriate municipal
department.'
At the close of the fiscal year, the city auditor will account for any surplus balance left in the city accounts and send a statement to the county
auditor, 19 who will prepare, for the county budget commission's approval,
2 0 to be sent back
an "amended official certificate of estimated resources,
to city council.
The most important part of this budget-making process comes at the
end, insofar as any city council is concerned and, especially, insofar as the
Atwood decision touches upon this process. Appropriations authorized by
a city council cannot "exceed the total of the estimated revenue available
for expenditures therefrom;"'" that is, the city cannot plan to spend more
in a department than the amount available to that department from its
designated accounts as indicated in the amended official certificate of estimated resources. Furthermore, the appropriations ordinance of city council
is only legally valid after it has been sent to the county auditor to certify
that it is within the limits of the amended official certificate.2" To a very
real extent, a municipality in Ohio is bound to follow for the course of a
year a piece of paper which was developed several months prior to that year.
III. THE CASE ON APPEAL AND A PRELIMINARY CRITIQUE
After reiterating the facts of the case, the Atwood court observed,
"We raised the question as to whether the issues in the case were moot,
because the evidence was directed at the financial condition of the city of
East Liverpool for the year 1976 which is now past history .... ",23 The
1Id.
16 Id.

17 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5705.35 (Page 1980).

is Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 5705.38 (Page 1980).
is OwIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5705.36 (Page 1980).
2o

Id.

21 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5705.39 (Page 1980).
22 Id.
23 63 Ohio App. 2d at 100, 409 N.E.2d at 1028.
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court determined that the central issues of the trial court's adjudication of
the case involved the amount of city funds available in 1976 to meet the
safety department's payroll. Since those revenues have been appropriated and
spent, the question does seem to be moot. The majority of the court believed,
however, that there was a need for them to hear the case on appeal because, "the injunction granted is a permanent one that continues beyond
the year 1976."I
2' The dissent found the mootness of the question to be
adequate reason not to overturn the trial court's issuance of the injunction,
at least to the extent that the injunction related "to the time and events of
'
the instant case. 25
There were three major issues on appeal: (1) whether the court had
jurisdiction over appellees who had not exhausted their administrative remedies; (2) whether the appellant's discretionary powers as Director of Public
Service-Safety included the power to lay-off employees; (3) whether he
had abused such powers.
Turning to the first question, the court stated that those appellees who
were directly affected by the lay-off decision did not have standing to sue,
because they had not first pursued their appeal to the East Liverpool Civil
Service Commission." In contrast, since the other appellees did not have
such access to an appeal, the court held "that they had no adequate remedy
at law and that the trial court properly took jurisdiction of this case." 7 In
8
The court cited Haught v. Dayton"
which limited suits by laid-off civil
service employees to those employees who have first taken their cause of
action to the local Civil Service Commission [hereinafter cited as C.S.C.].
In light of the problem which prompted the discharge of the employees in
East Liverpool, the use of such a forum in Atwood seems inappropriate.
Assuming that they had appealed to the C.S.C., the C.S.C. could conceivably
have ordered their reinstatement.2 0 Such an action on the part of the C.S.C.
could, at best, be described as an abstract gesture, since, in the words of one
writer, commenting on the power of non-legislative bodies to order the legislative expenditure of money, they "can neither levy a tax nor appropriate funds
from the public treasury.""0 If the C.S.C. were to order the reinstatement of

24

Id.

63 Ohio App. 2d at 112, 409 N.E.2d at 1034.
63 Ohio App. 2d at 100, 409 N.E.2d at 1028. For an excellent summary of this area of
the law, see Comment, Judicial Review of Zoning Administration, 22 CLEVE. ST. L. REv. 338
(1973).
27 Id. at 101, 409 N.E.2d at 1028.
28 34 Ohio St. 2d 32, 295 N.E.2d 404 (1973),
9 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 124.34 (Page 1978).
30 Mountain, The Role of Judicial Activism: Neither Sword Nor Purse?, 10 Sf'ON HALL L.
REv. 6 (1979), at 9.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/8
25
26
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the employees/appellees, that action would not solve the problem of how
those employees were going to be paid.
In the determination of whether the Director of Public Service-Safety
possessed the discretion to lay off city employees in times of insufficient
funds, both the trial and appeals courts analyzed Gannon v. Perk," the
principal case in Ohio on this point.
In Gannon, the administrators of the city of Cleveland, faced with a
similar financial situation, announced the lay-off of city police and fire
department personnel. In a suit brought by the policemen's and fire fighter's
unions to prevent such lay-offs, the Ohio Supreme Court, on appeal, found
justification for the lay-offs in the fact that there was a lack of funds available
to pay the employees: "Lack of funds induced when projected income falls
below anticipated expenses is a legitimate basis for laying off civil service
employees, including safety personnel, so long as such lay-offs are made
in conformity with law.""2
The trial court rejected the applicability of Gannon to Atwood."3 The
appeals court reversed," ' relying on State v. Munson,"' another case quoted
at length in Gannon.
In Munson, the Cleveland Commissioner of Auditorium and Stadium
in the Department of Public Properties was laid off. The former commissioner brought suit to regain his position by requesting a writ of mandamus from
the Ohio Supreme Court. That Court denied his writ, finding that it had
not been "made to appear that a clear legal right [of relator's] ...exists.""6
Munson can be distinguished from both Gannon and Atwood by pointing out one of that court's key underlying assumptions: "[w]e look in vain
for any averments in the petition which would warrant the conclusion therein stated that the position [job] held by the relator is being abolished or
that such result is contemplated by the respondent."" The Munson court,
in rendering its decision in favor of the city of Cleveland, assumed that at
some point in the future money would become available to rehire the laidoff employee. By making this assumption, the court reinforced its
argument that the employee has not been removed, since 'removal' implies
a permanent condition. It is somewhat doubtful that most courts adjudicating

a' 46 Ohio St. 2d 301, 348 N.E.2d 342 (1976).
82Id. at 313, 348 N.E.2d at 349.
83 63 Ohio App. 2d at 102, 348 N.E.2d at 1029.
"Id.
85 141 Ohio St. 319, 48 N.E.2d 109 (1943).
geld. at 326, 48 N.E.2d at 113.
37 Id. at 324, 48 N.E.2d at 113.
Published
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the claim of a laid-off employee could presume that the money would
eventually become available to rehire the former employee."9
After determining that the Gannon holding was binding upon Atwood,
the majority focused on the issue of whether the lay-offs were made in
"conformity with law. '39 As the Gannon court stated, "the power to lay off
municipal employees must repose within the sound discretion of the mayor
of the city . . . to be exercised in accordance with the law.""0 In the case
of East Liverpool, because the mayor's authority had been delegated to
appellant the question became whether appellant had acted within his discretion when he ordered the lay-offs.
Gannon may be compared to Atwood in two important respects. The
Gannon court stated that the difference between a civil action for an injunction
and a suit for a declaratory judgment is crucial in determining the justiciability
of the case before them. 1 It noted that plaintiffs' action against the city was
for a declaratory judgment, rather than for an injunction. "2 In Atwood, the
suit was for an injunction, rather than a declaratory judgment. "3 However,
this distinction does not appear to be a relevant factor in either case.
In both cases, plaintiffs asked the court to second-guess the executive
and legislative branches of the local municipal governments in their act of
weighing the financial alternatives and service expenditures for their cities.
Plaintiffs, in each case, pointed out alternative sources of funds that the
city could utilize to pay those employees who were to be laid off. In Gannon, plaintiffs referred to the fact that there was a substantial number of
temporary city employees on the payroll, allegedly in violation of the city
charter, who were to be retained while police and fire fighting personnel
were to be discharged for lack of funds." Plaintiffs asked the court to order
the city to lay off those temporary employees in lieu of the police and fire
fighting personnel., 5 Had the court taken this action, the majority, in effect,
would have set the priorities for hiring and firing of city employees. In
Atwood, 9 the plaintiffs pointed to a surplus of funds that was apparently
available to the city and not earmarked for any particular purpose, which

as See

generally Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976 DuKr
LJ. 1119 (1976) and Mulcahy, Ability to Pay: The Public Employee Dilemma, 31 ARn. J.

90 (1976).
8946 Ohio St. 2d at 313, 348 N.E.2d at 349.

40d.
1ld. at 306-310, 348 N.E.2d at 346-348.
42 ld. at 309, 348 N.E.2d at 347.

63 Ohio App. 2d at 95, 409 N.E.2d at 1025.
4446 Ohio St. 2d at 310-312, 348 N.E.2d'at 348-349.
4 ld. at 311, 348 N.E.2d at 349.
46 63 Ohio App. 2d at 106, 409 N.E.2d at 1031.
4
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could have been used to pay the salaries of those personnel who were to be
laid off. They asked the court to compel the city to allocate its money
in a specific way. In neither case was the court willing to second-guess the
legislative and executive branches of the city when the situation involved
a municipal official's decision that appeared to be within the discretion of
that official.
Drawing from the precedent of Gannon, the Atwood court found that
the lay-offs had been "made in conformity with law."" This was despite the
fact that there were East Liverpool ordinances that explicitly set the number
"8
of police and fire fighting personnel to be hired. The public safety director
had, according to the court, an overriding interest in keeping his expenditures
within the legislated appropriations ordinance."
The Atwood majority chose to ignore a dictum from Gannon that would
seem to distinguish that case on the matter of making lay-offs in conformity with law. The Ohio Supreme Court in Gannon stated that if it
could be established that the lay-offs in question would endanger the public
.welfare, then such a fact must be weighed by the court in considering "the
legality of the lay offs."" ° The dissent in Atwood pointed to this dictum
as support for its position that the trial court's judgment should be over1
turned only insofar as it granted a permanent injunction. It is interesting
to note that the majority perceived the lay-offs as quite possibly endangering the city,5" but refused to accept that possibility as relevant to its adjudication of the case.
The case law in Ohio relating to the duty of a public safety director
to keep his expenditures within the budget despite the existence of an
ordinance by city council fixing the number of safety employees dates back
53
to 1904. In Osborne v. City of Columbus, the plaintiff was a member of the
Columbus fire department who had been laid off due to a lack of city
funds. He appealed to the C.S.C. who ordered his reinstatement. The city,
refusing to comply, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, where plaintiffs
claim was rejected. The court, in its discussion of the duty of the public
safety director, noted "[I]n other words while the city council had fixed the
number of firemen . . . it did not in fact provide the funds from which

Ohio St. 2d 301,
47 63 Ohio App. 2d at 103, 409 N.E.2d at 1029 citing Gannon v. Perk, 46

313, 348 N.E.2d 342, 349 (1976).
48 63 Ohio App. 2d at 96, 409 N.E.2d at 1025.
4 id. at 103, 409 N.E.2d at 1029.
0 46 Ohio St. 2d at 314, 348 N.E.2d at 350.
51 63 Ohio App. 2d at 111, 409 N.E.2d at 1034.
52

Id. at 110, 409 N.E.2d at 1033.

53 3 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
1130 (1906).

1, 15 Ohio Dec. 561 (1904); aff'd mem. 75 Ohio St. 588, 80 N.E.
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the director could pay them . . . . It seems to me that if these averments
. . . be established . . . the plaintiff cannot recover.""' The legitimacy
of the director's action was rebuttably presumed by the court, given the
fact of city council's seemingly irreconcilable enactments.
Curtis v. State,6 5 which was decided in 1923, is also relevant on this
point. In the Ohio Supreme Court, appellant, the safety director of Canton,
appealed from a judgment in favor of Catherine Morgan, a former 'police
matron' for the city, who had been laid off because of insufficient funds
allocated to the safety department. The court upheld the appellant's right
to lay off Mrs. Morgan, reversing the court of appeals decision. In its
unanimous opinion, the court said, "It is clearly the duty of the safety
department to keep its expenditures within the revenues and the appropriations, because money cannot legally be borrowed to defray current expenses. 5 6 Although these cases were not cited, the Atwood majority clearly
adopted this theory in formulating its opinion.
The question of what priority to follow in laying off public employees,
a central concern in Gannon," is to be left entirely to the discretion of the
mayor, according to the Atwood court. Due to the lack of any enactment
in this area by the East Liverpool City Council, the court found that the
appellant was within his statutory powers58 in making the decision to lay
off the city employees.5" The court noted that "city council can subsequently
change such administrative decisions by amending the appropriation ordinance by changing the priorities for laying off employees . . ."6 This statement intimated that the appellee's only remedy was to petition the city
council to pass a statute that would explicitly set lay-off priorities. The
court did not consider the fact that such a remedy would take considerably
more time than obtaining a temporary restraining order from the local
court.
The Atwood majority clearly rejected the trial court's finding that
the decision by appellant was a "gross abuse of discretion"61 and in "excess
of his powers and duties, '' principally because of trial testimony that
showed "...
if spending continued at the same level that it existed at the

54 Id. at 5, 15 Ohio Dec. at 564.
55 108 Ohio St. 292, 140 N.E. 522 (1923).
5 ld. at 302, 140 N.E. at 525.
57 46 Ohio St. 2d at 313, 348 N.E.2d at 350.

5s Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 737.02 (Page 1976).
50 63 Ohio App. 2d at 103, 409 N.E.2d at 1030.

w Id.
e163 *Ohio App. 2d at 96, 409 N.E.2d at 1025.
62 ld.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/8
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time the lay-offs were made the amounts appropriated for both firemen and
policemen would be insufficient to pay their projected salary requirements." 3
Since such an occurrence would have been in direct violation of state
statute, " the court felt that an adequate basis for appellant's action had
been established. In this regard, the court stated that the appellant could
validly take into account only two factors, "the amended official certificate
of estimated resources and the appropriations of Council,""5 in making
his decision to lay off.66
By adopting this rationale, the court effectively precluded the possibility of reviewing the evidence of the city's fiscal condition that appellees
had presented at trial. Appellees had produced data which showed that
the tax revenue flowing into the accounts designated for the salaries of police
and fire fighter was greater than the figure listed on the amended official certificate of estimate and that there existed surpluses in other city accounts
which could have been transferred to the safety department accounts.?
In confronting appellees' evidence on the first point, the court con68
sidered the role of the city auditor in the municipal financing procedure.
By statute, it is the auditor's duty to inform the county budget commission
and the county auditor of such additional revenue, when and if it comes
into city accounts." The court was unwilling to find that appellant could have
considered the existence of such additional tax revenue, since before that
possibility it was necessary to have the surplus certified to the county budget
commission. It does, however, suggest that it could have considered the liability of the city auditor for dereliction of duty, but the auditor was not a party
to the action.1°
The court used a similar approach when it considered appellee's
evidence as to the existence of surpluses in other city funds capable of
transfer to the public safety fund. The court held that this did not give rise
to a responsibility on the part of appellant to have decided any differently
than he did because "the proper forum to whose attention.., this matter
[should have been brought] was Council who had the authority to amend the
appropriation ordinance by transferring funds."'" It is apparent, then, that the

63 63 Ohio App. 2d at 106, 409 N.E.2d at 1031.
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.39 (Page 1980).
65 63 Oh.io App. 2d at 109, 409 N.E.2d at 1033.
66 ld.
67 63 Ohio App. 2d at 106, 409 N.E.2d at 1031.
68 Id. at 107, 108, 409 N.E.2d at 1032.
64

69 Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.36 (Page 1980).
70.63 Ohio App. 2d at 108, 409 N.E.2d at 1032.
71Id.
Published
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court's insistence upon the fact that appellant could consider only the
amended official certificate of official resources and the city's annual appropriations ordinance rendered the introduction of evidence of other surplus funds meaningless.
Such an insistence coincides with the view of the court in Curtis v. State,
"there was a possibility that other revenues might have drifted into the
general fund, and that a transfer could have been made. . . . [Tlhe courts
could [not] control the action of the city council in the matter of transfer
of funds.'" 2
The majority opinion puts the priority question" in another light
when it characterized it as "political in nature.""4 They found that "a difference of opinion or judgment is not sufficient to allow a court to interfere
with such a decision";"' that is, the decision of "which employees to lay
off and what services to curtail.""0 The only option left to the appellees
for expressing their dissatisfaction with the decision is pursuing the removal
of those officials responsible through voter recall.""
M

Throughout its opinion, the majority shares the view of the United States
Supreme Court that to "bring about conflict with two coordinate branches [of
government]" 8 whereby the judiciary could be characterized as "providing
'government by injunction',"" is undesirable and should be avoided at all
costs. In refusing to shed its judicial light on a "political decision," the
majority has chosen not to decide "which of many competing social interests are more valuable and worthy of protection."" In this regard, it is
worth noting again that while the majority agreed with the trial court that
the impact of the lay-offs in East Liverpool would be adverse,"' it refused to
protect that social interest. By placing appellees' claim in the category of "political question," 2 the court followed an established judicial doctrine of
avoiding the adjudication of controversial governmental decisions.

108 Ohio St. 308, 140 N.E. 527.
7 46 Ohio St. 2d at 311, 348 N.E.2d at 349.
7463 Ohio App. 2d at 110, 409 N.E.2d at 1033.
151d.
72

7e Id.

77d., referring to OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 705.92 (Page 1976).
v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974);
referred to in Note, Standing and the Propriety of Judicial Intervention: Reviving~a Traditional Approach?, 52 NOTRE D~wE LAW, 944, 955 (1977).
79 418 U.S. at 222.
8052 NomE DAME LAW. 944, 955 (1977).
8163 Ohio App. 2d at 110, 409 N.E.2d at 1033.
82
See generally, Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analytss,
75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/8
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Despite a recognition of the mootness of the central issue of the case,
the majority chose to render a decision in Atwood. Ostensibly, this is because the injunction against the lay-offs extended indefinitely into the future.
This is not a valid concern as the trial court would have had continued
8
jurisdiction in dealing with the permanent injunction and could have
8
changed it at "any time on proof of a change of conditions." Presumably,
the permanent injunction could have been challenged in any subsequent
year in the trial court by the appellant, if the appellate court had sustained
the finding of the trial court. To successfully challenge the injunction, appellant would have been required to prove a change in the conditions of
East Liverpool such that the lay-offs would no longer "adversely affect . . .
the inhabitants" 5 and that the city did not have sufficient funds with which
to keep all of its safety forces employed. The majority, in Atwood, either
ignored established Ohio law in this regard or was not aware of it when
rendering its opinion. It can only be inferred from the decision that the
majority was not so much concerned with the fact that the trial court's
injunction was permanent, but, instead, with the court's very power to
issue such an injunction.

IV.

A FINAL

CRITICISM

The Atwood case is worthy of note not so much for what it says, but
for what it omits. One of these omissions is the fact that the lay-offs in
question involved a rather substantial percentage of the city's safety forces
- roughly 20% of both the police and fire departments. This is never discussed in the opinion. Such a fact clearly differentiates Atwood from all
the other Ohio cases concerned with public employee lay-offs. In no other
case is the number of employees to be laid off nearly as extensive as in
Atwood. 8 No city should be permitted to lose a fifth of its safety personnel
to forced lay-offs; such a fact seems grounds for a finding that appellant
did in fact commit a plain disregard of duty. Without a doubt, it substantiates
the trial court's finding that the lay-offs "would have dangerously injured
the health, safety and welfare of the City of East Liverpool."" This finding
served as the basis for the issuance of the injunction by the trial court.
On appeal, though, the issue of whether this constituted an adequate basis
at law for the rendering of an injunction was completely side-stepped.
In Ohio, there are adequate legal grounds for injunctive relief if it

0. JUrL 2d Injunctions, § 201 (1958).
- Id.at 430.
65 63 Ohio App. 2d at 110, 409 N.E.2d at 1033.
"eIn Gannon, the number of personnel to be laid off was roughly ten percent of all employees,
Akron Beacon Journal, November 22, 1974, at A-10, col. 1.
App. 2d at 96, 409
87 63
Published
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would serve to thwart "irreparable injury or mischief." 8 An action that
would have "dangerously injured the health, safety and welfare of the
residents of the city of East Liverpool"8 9 could be said to fall in the category
of "irreparable injury." The majority in Atwood avoided this interpretation,
despite the fact that the various alternative courses of action it suggested
to appellees as adequate remedies are time-consuming, and would tend
to heighten the possibility of "dangerous injury" to the public welfare. The
majority's omission in this area is based on its interest in avoiding conflict
between two coordinate branches of government.
It becomes clear from a careful reading of Atwood that there can be
a lack of coherent action on the part of the executive and legislative branches
of municipal government in regard to efficient utilization of funds. Every
city's inhabitants have a viable right to adequate police and fire protection.
If that right is violated by the absence of intragovernmental coordination
in allocating available funds, then the public welfare has been damaged
in a very real sense, perhaps irreparably. The danger that the Atwood
majority fails to acknowledge is that if the courts do not step in to correctly allocate such funds, it may be too late by the time the legislative
and executive processes of municipal government are employed.
WARREN

88 29 0. JuL. 2d Injunctions, § 33 (1958).
89 63 Ohio App. 2d at 96, 409 NE.2d at 1025.
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